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Abstract: This paper analyzes Lesotho’s agricultural market in both state-regulated and liberalized policy. It 
identifies institutional constraints inhibiting efficient marketing in both policy systems. Realization of such 
constraints constitutes an analytic illumination on the formulation of strategies for poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development through agricultural marketing as the main sector with 86% of Lesotho’s poor 
subsistence producers. This desk-study comprehends the state and the market as imperfect institutions in 
sustainable development and alleviating poverty by unearthing constraints to pre and post agricultural market 
reforms in Lesotho. It thus examines Lesotho’s agricultural market transitory situational analysis and 
organization, providing empowering lessons in poverty reduction and sustainable development at grassroots 
level. Forms of state intervention before market reform, market reform process and progress and the institutional 
constraints and implications in poverty reduction and sustainable development are covered to attain critical 
lessons as cognitive knowledge applicable in empowering the poor in crops production, food security and 
sustainable development. State and the market and their active interaction have globally been believed to be 
institutional agencies with the main role of distributing resources towards poverty reduction and sustainable 
development but their imperfections and constraints hampering effectiveness and efficiency of such a role still 
lack adequate contextual review to effectively increase productivity and enrich lives of the poor agricultural 
producers, particularly in Lesotho.   
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This paper analyzes Lesotho agricultural market structure in both state and liberalized (Free Trade) policy 
system. It identifies institutional and policy constraints that have inhibited efficient marketing in both 
situations and therefore poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies. Recognizing these 
constraints sheds light on both strategic options for agricultural marketing/trading as the main sector in 
which most of the Lesotho poor are involved. The paper provides an analysis of the generic marketing 
organization of crops produce in Lesotho. Constraints to non-liberalized and liberalized marketing form pre-
eminence in this analytic discourse. A guiding question is; what are the political institutional and economic 
policy constraints that hamper non-liberalized and liberalized agricultural marketing and what are their 
implications serving as lessons in poverty alleviation and sustainable development in the agricultural market. 
The paper argues and assumes that there are institutional and economic policy imperfections in both 
regulated and liberalized markets/free trade but most importantly, furthermore, large-scale monopolies 
suppress individual private sector development efforts in both regulated and deregulated markets and as 
such the market may never be efficient and effective in inducing sustainable development and reducing 
poverty of the poor and weak subsistence producers through its transactionery distribution of income, goods 
and services and socio-economic entitlements and opportunities.  
  
Pre-liberalization or non-free trade refers to state-led agricultural market era before 1995 privatization. 
During intervention/regulation, government of Lesotho (GOL) since 1966 provided various resources and 
subsidy in crops and livestock production, marketing, processing and service provision through state-led 
enterprises. However, trade losses due to supplying below production costs, poor management, corruption, 
and suppression of private sector’s growth and profitability justified privatization of such enterprises to 
reverse the situation through liberalization/free trade policy entailing deregulation and privatization. 
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International Monetary Fund/IMF and World Bank enforced this as financial lending conditionality. The 
policy was known as Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs). Though, SAPs was officially declared in 1995, 
actual gradual implementation in various sectors is traceable from 1985. While liberalization may have its 
potentials, in the local context it lacked explicit improvement objectives for poor peasants, the majority 
population and was hence limited (GOL, Technical Report M, 1999). The paper’s structure is as follows; after 
this introductory part, there is a review of the state intervention/agricultural market regulation and 
deregulation interlaced with the constraints requiring expository analysis if the agricultural market is to 
induce sustainable development and reduce poverty of the weak producers either in the regulatory or 
deregulatory era. System and description analysis, extrapolations, simulation, excerption and constructive 
data ‘collapsing’ form research methods for this paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Review of Lesotho Agricultural Market Intervention Prior 1995 Liberalization: GOL used to regulate 
agricultural marketing significantly. There was direct government involvement in production, pricing, 
marketing and processing of agricultural commodities. Production was highly subsidized and there was 
provision of agricultural services and inputs to peasants. GOL controlled marketing and production of 
agricultural commodities for many decades since 1965 political independence from Britain mainly through 
Co-op Lesotho Ltd (used to be the apex of the cooperative movement in Lesotho) and large-scale mills for 
cereals (Lesotho Flour Mills and Maseru Roller Mills). This was also generally done through parastatal 
organizations, government enterprises and government service sectors under great subsidies. Major 
objectives of this market interference by GOL included protecting farmers from exploitation by foreign 
traders and transforming of agricultural productivity. However, organizational institutional and financial 
government policy constraints such as the 'red tape', financial regulations combined with poor managerial 
skills across sectors directly inhibited commercial trading policies of profit making and sustainability in 
enterprises. The problematic effects seen under this old public management therefore included difficulty in 
cost recoupment, inept and poor implementation, and inefficient market information dissemination 
combined with recorded apparent motivation failures and rent-seeking (ASIP, 1997, see Ellis, 1992:12). This 
poor performance of GOL run agricultural enterprises confirms 'real’ rather than ‘abstract’ markets 
perspective which may be reflected by this statement; "The recognition of the general imperfection of 
(liberalized) markets does not imply, however, that governments can necessarily do better. Economics has 
recognized that governments are also imperfect institutions and that such imperfect institutions need to be 
understood”. Analytic inference of above situation may be shown diagrammatically as below; 
 
Figure 1: GoL Pre-Liberalization Market Intervention Extent  
 













(See Pekka, 1997:7) 
 
Subsidized peasants countrywide were provided with transport to bring their cereals to large-scale mills and 
Co-op, which paid them at fixed prices and redistributed to market outlets at controlled prices. Any cereal 
producer could bring produce to market through these institutions. However, for livestock, ‘Livestock 
Products Marketing Services’/LPMS and ‘National Abattoir and Feedlot Complex’/NAFC replaced Co-op and 
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large-scale mills. These institutions used to be under absolute GOL control and ownership until 1995. Though 
LPMS privatization process is delayed, Co-op is closed from reported mismanagement and collapse, large-
scale mills and NAFC are now privatized (Lehohla, Lebusa, Lenka, Moteane, Lethunya and Mohau, 1993).    
 
3. Liberalization Market Policy Process and Progress 
 
In response to the poor performance of GOL controlled enterprises, the 1995 Privatization Act established 
Privatization Unit under the Ministry of finance. The Unit has now spent US$11 million sponsored by GOL and 
World Bank. The Unit's responsibility is to act on behalf of the government in coordinating and affecting the 
process of preparing state owned enterprises for privatization. State owned enterprises and services are sold 
to the private sector with market forces. Therefore, the actual privatization process involves the line Ministry, 
Privatization Unit, cabinet and 'private traders' who are sometimes RSA (Republic of South Africa) driven 
though it is legally declared that they should partly be Lesotho citizenship. Actual transfer of assets or leases 
may involve legal practitioners, credit institutions and Lands Department (GOL, 1999). Deregulation was 
adopted to cultivate a conducive environment for this commercial policy to work. This was meant to facilitate 
participation and development of the private sector in agricultural sector and enable efficient allocation of 
resources in most benefiting sectors. The hope was to achieve competitive agricultural production, marketing 
and processing. It was also assumed that food security would be attained other than formerly pursued food 
self-sufficiency under regulated market. The government was left with the technical advising and facilitation 
role. Unfortunately, reportedly the institutional and economic policy constraints have been market failures 
and weakness of private sector to develop because people have low skills' level, lack capital and united 
managerial capabilities. Lack of supply of critical services and inputs to support agricultural production, 
cause sustainable development and alleviate poverty in remote places where private traders find it 
uneconomic to invest due to economies of scale absence has resulted in at least 86% of the peasants 
untransformed and worse than before. The number of fallow fields has increased and food prices have sky 
rocketed. The role of technical advising and facilitation is counteracted by the same liberal policy 
contradiction for efficiency of labor downsizing ever-continuing (ASIP, 1997 and Lehohla, Lebusa, Lenka, 
Moteane, Lethunya and Mohau, 1993).          
 
Although the economic impact of liberalization to the government has been savings in recurrent expenditure, 
revenue increment from rent and set field for competitive private sector, peasants' interests, needs, and their 
involvement have not been part of the process. They remain neglected since there are no mechanisms 
developed to channel or trickle down any such benefits from government. The government has benefited 
more and the poor are continuing to be poor. Industrial growth and its increase in demand for food supply 
have not been harnessed to maximize such an opportunity. More complications are that monopolies in 
service provision have been created hindering diversification in crops production. This promoted 
inappropriate maize production practices inducing soil degradation (ASIP, 1997 and GOL Technical Report, 
1999). There is still some existence of subsidy for the benefit of these few privatized monopolies in the form 
of subsidized credits and government paid staff. Such monopoly subsidy is mostly prevalent in technical 
operations unit (TOU) for tractor hiring services and specialized farm services like animal and plant breeding, 
combine harvesting, delivery system and others. This confirms the statement that, “Small farmers have been 
adversely affected by the withdrawal of supports (SAPs) while some large scale farmers and (transnational 
corporations) TNCs continue to enjoy hidden subsidies (Ellis, 1998)”. Therefore, further influence on prices 
continues disabling private sector growth. May be this could be on the justification of weak private sector but 
this stifles it further. Alternative means of continuing with the subsidy to benefit the poor with their 
involvement has not been sought. Instead, monopolies, which are usually blamed for not taking market price 
thereby determining prices, hamper perfect market competition. Large-scale mills for grain storage and 
supply still serve as main stations for selling of countrywide farmers’ produce at fixed GOL controlled prices 
for either price stabilization or agricultural terms of trade favoring urban population and not necessarily to 
transform them from subsistence to sustainable agribusiness.  
 
Effectually, large-scale mills have become monopolies determining and controlling prices through mill door 
and GOL declared prices not for the cost of production recovery by peasants, limiting diversification by 
determining which crops are marketable. This does not increase their income within this policy restrictions 
and contradictions in the 1995 declared liberalized market. National parity pricing severely disfavors farmers 
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highly unequally because transport and other costs to these main price monopoly stations are not at par. 
While the genuine reason could be quality control through grading, illicit charges on farmers for quick service 
or favorable grade and waiting for payments may stifle market competition. In some cases, especially in Co-op 
Lesotho as was another major marketing outlet, social class and power determined which farmer may be 
served first and at which ‘grade’. Logically, monopolistic market environment by large-scale mills and Co-op 
Lesotho contradict and constrain liberalization and perfect competition as they also ultimately determine pan-
seasonal and pan-territorial pricing disproportionately benefiting peasants experiencing variant transport and 
input costs thereby creating spatial disparity and inequity. Perfect competition or liberalization and monopoly 
or monopsony may not logically co-exist (ASIP, 1997, Lehohla, Lebusa, Lenka, Moteane, Lethunya and Mohau, 
1993, and FAO, 1987:105). Above analysis makes inference of diagram below; 
 
Figure 2: Agricultural Marketing after Structural Adjustment  
SUBSISTENCE  COMMERCIAL 'FREE' MARKET            GOL SUPPORT    
 












         
 
(See Pekka, 1997:7)                          
 
4. Incidences since 1995, Liberalization Constraints and Implications 
 
The process of liberalization has now started in Lesotho since 1995. Government assets (machinery, building 
stores) used in subsidized input sale and distribution are being advertised for privatization. However, only 
already wealthier people are able to access and possess these assets. Although Co-op Lesotho is privatized as 
was revived from its downfall of 1993 through SAPs aid support, GOL is still a shareholder. Inputs and animal 
feeds have become of poor quality in large supplies across the country at unaffordable prices to peasants. 
Hybrids that made better returns are now rare and too expensive. The 'privatized' Co-op is able to do as such 
as it have no effective competitor countrywide. Hence, agricultural production has become 14% of GDP 
declining from former 30% to 40%.  Inputs supplying stores have become few and nonexistent in remote 
areas, those that are there are too expensive, usually out of stock taking long time to restock and lack input 
diversification. Timelines in input supply has become a constraint in production causing late planting. 
Peasants do not afford transport costs for afar town based input stores. There is more food aid needed than 
before and there are more food aid dependent programs than before as confirmed by GOL (1999 and 2000-
2002) reports. Instead of food security there is heavy food aid dependency improperly rationed and often 
marked by striving, political biases and conflicts. The cost of this normal functioning of 'free' market is social 
unrest, high unprecedented livestock armed robbery, raiding and theft countrywide. Due to above reasons 
there has been agricultural decline since 1990s as table below confirms (ASIP, 1997).   
 
Before market liberalization, GOL policies aimed at reducing dependence on food imports and protect 
domestic producers against unfair competition from subsidized RSA's farmers. Liberalized market opens up 
local production to such stiff unfair continuing competition resulting in undermining of local individual 
efforts. This external factor adds to internal stifling ones on individual private efforts and the only 14% 
surplus producers will decline further. Present crops marketing structure is such that Lesotho's most 
domestic production is for subsistence and some informal trade. Cereal deficits are met by import from world 
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market. Two large-scale mills are still there, Lesotho Flour Mills (LFM) owning a wholesale, Lesotho Milling 
Company shared between GOL through Lesotho National Development Corporation and RSA's company Tiger 
Oats. Large-scale mills still receive farmers' produce for marketing, store more than 100,000 tons of maize 
and wheat, and due to their economies of scale in pursuit of food security suppress private producers and 
small-scale mills (See Mair and Miller, 1991). After liberalization, industrial mills still hold most of staple 
maize grain imports choking private local efforts at sales’ level. Monopoly and monopsony created under 
liberalization that replaced state evil of minimum producer prices, maximum selling or mill door prices, pan-
territorial and pan-seasonal producer prices and import parity pricing above market prices by powerful 
institutions in 'free' market continue depriving poor ones of food accessibility, choking private local 
producers and small-scale mills at sales’ level, service provision and employment creation (See ASIP, 1997 
and ICA, 1985-1995). 
 












































































































  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(GOL Main Report, 1999) 
 
Conflicting objectives hinder liberalized market since in crops sector GOL still owns farms for crops 
diversification strategy, experimentation, demonstration facility and seedling production for high value crops, 
though liberalization is adopted. Crops from government farms are not sold at commercial prices and stifle 
private sector price functioning and its development. This constrains economic viability of private producers. 
Marketing information system is still not well developed to cover quantities, location and commodity prices, 
market growth will be inhibited. Guaranteed market channels and stable prices farmers used to enjoy 
through Co-op and Large-scale mills are now nonexistent. Peasants have to face unstable volatile prices and 
powerless negotiating against powerful traders' exploitation (in fact most of the supermarkets retailing 
produce from local farmers are sole severe (buying) price setters and selling price givers for profit 
maximization) (ASIP, 1997 and Jayne, Mukumbu, Chisvo, Tschirley, Weber, Zulu, Johansson, Santos and 
Soroko.1999). Peasants no more have guaranteed transport, storing facilities, credit and input sources, many 
of them are held under grip of lacking. Particularly, lack of machinery, tractor distribution and access is 
skewed and concentrated in the very few hands as table below confirms. The 1995 market liberalization has 
not actually redistributed and changed this; instead, it worsened it because only six tractors still remained 
accessible per 1000 producers. Only the nominal figure of tractors increased from 47 to 63 concentrating in 
few hands whereby the already rich got richer and the poor remaining poorer because such machinery 
availability never transformed into accessibility as poor producers lacked cash to rent or buy such machinery, 
except for the already well off ones. Accessibility of agricultural machinery remained consistently poor never 
changing from the six producers per 1000 (World Development Indicators, 2000).  
 
Table 2: Lesotho Machinery/Tractor Ownership and Distribution Pre and Post 1995 SAPs  
Tractor Distribution  1980-90 1990-98 
Agricultural machinery/Tractors per 1000 workers 
Tractors per 100 hectares of arable land 








Their risks are highly increased, those who try to continue remain profitless due to high input and transport 
costs worsened by lack of ready formal marketing channels replaced by retailers and wholesalers who lord 
prices, make them incur high unknown transaction and packaging costs. GOL institutions now compete with 
them severely at the level of production, marketing and processing. Obviously, privatization and non-
privatization in Lesotho have a problem of pare to optimum since equilibrium may not easily exist under 
these market circumstances. Now there are failures of competition, provision and insufficient markets, 
macro-economic problems such as inflation and monopolies, asymmetric market information, poverty and 
lack of sustainable development and social inequality. The obvious lack of political commitment on GOL, 
policy vacillation and treating liberalization as an abdication or short-run process lead to endless 
complications and ineffective liberalization (See Ellis, 1992, ASIP, 1997 and Jayne and Jones, 2010). 
 
5. Analytic Conclusions on Lesotho Agricultural Marketing Reforms and Constraints against 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
 
Global and regional strategies to utilise comparative advantages in production for food security are lacking. One 
of institutional constraints to liberalized agricultural marketing could be communal land tenure demerit of 
allowing unregulated common open access promoting overgrazing that deteriorates rangeland. This type of 
liberalization limits livestock market supply and sustainability/sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
Though there is "Tragedy of Commons" problem, Basotho do not regard land tenure as a critical problem. They 
perceive problems to be improper grazing, land use, and institutional land administrative conflicts between chiefs 
with traditional powers and local councillors with political power striving for control over resources. Grassroots 
farmers associations legally empowered to manage resources for themselves could be most ideal and not an 
institution lacking felt needs and direct interest. Traditional social-political structures are not innovative enough 
and constrain liberalization. Associations could do better bearing direct interest. The fact is communal grazing 
leads to no accountability by users resulting in overstocking on rangeland preventing regrowth. This affects 
quality of wool and mohair and milk production. Liberalization adoption laid off some government livestock 
technical staff, remaining is too few to provide any effective technical support for quality breeding for market. 
They are also not decentralised at least according to farmers associations, instead they still make unimpactful 
seldom field trips. This policy framework is thus constrained by inadequate undecentralized trained manpower 
resulting in untrained peasants remaining attitudinally untransformed regarding keeping much unproductive 
livestock as store of wealth only for prestige and occasional traditional rituals/ceremonies (GOL, 1999, Green, 
2000, Mashinini, 1982, Mashinini, and De Villiers, 2001 and Murray, 1981). 
 
Agricultural productivity and marketing in Lesotho is reported to be constrained by RSA's economy. It is argued 
that peasants lack incentive to work on farm due to now rare supplement from migrant earnings from RSA. This 
could be true to some extent but in the face of high mineworkers’ retrenchment due to technological advances 
and gold depreciation, this reasoning overlooks other internal and external issues. It is Basotho who are mostly 
managing immediately bordering RSA's farms to Lesotho, highly equipped with capital on land with the same 
climate as Lesotho’s. Lesotho has technological policy constraint adversely affecting agricultural market supply, 
hence immediate alternative now, and scarce migrant employment. There is no profitable capital distributive 
contract farming. Some authors continue to argue that wives of migrants are already exhausted from house 
chores and have ample time for farming. This overlooks arguments like migrant earnings have been too low and 
exploitative compelling wives to adopt various means of survival livelihoods, let alone customary gender division 
of labour in agriculture requiring wives to hoe, weed, harvest, process and class pulses for marketing. Low 
returns to their labour due to lack of implements, inputs and combination of environmental factors like soil 
erosion, steep land topography and occasional drought are more direct constraints. If anything, migrant earnings 
enable them to access some agricultural implements and draft animals but insufficient for agricultural 
intensification considering tractorization concentrated in few hands in liberalization as shown in the table above.  
While it could be argued that male labour being migrant workers creates labour shortage in farming, that 
overlooks cyclic migration that allows them to come home every month and even nicknamed 'weekenders' or 
seasonal-comers particularly for ploughing and festive seasons. Liberalization in Lesotho is constrained by lack of 
economies of scale relative to global productivity, having to do with lacking capital, public, fiscal and physical 
infrastructure and indigenous self-organization (Setai, 1984, GOL, 1999, Brokken, Swallow, Motsamai and Mpemi, 
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